Background Statements re IM
Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and
Personnel Infiltration in Indochina

No Date	Summary of Logistics Data in SRG Studies, April 1971 and November 1971
No Date	Series of tables re enemy logistics requirements and inputs for 1970/71 dry season, estimated 1971 wet season, 1971/72 dry season
No Date	Notes to Paper for Dr. Kissinger, Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and Personnel Infiltration in Indochina (manpower requirements)
Report*	ER IM 71-218, Khmer Communist Combat Forces in Cambodia, [redacted] 25X1 25X1
Report*	ER IM, Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and Personnel Infiltration in Indochina [redacted] 25X1

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Memorandum

Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and Personnel Infiltration in Indochina

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November 1971

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

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
November 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

RECENT TRENDS IN ENEMY SUPPLY AND PERSONNEL INFILTRATION IN INDOCHINA

Introduction

1. A review of North Vietnam's logistical and manpower infiltration into southern Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam during the 1970/71 dry season and the just-ended wet season provides benchmarks against which to judge the current status of the Communist forces in the war theaters as well as some guide as to Hanoi's capabilities for mounting major offensive activities during the current dry season. This memorandum builds on the analysis presented in the several studies completed last spring for the Senior Review Group and adheres to the basic methodological presentation in those studies.

Summary

2. The Communists enter the 1971/72 dry season in a manpower and logistics position not greatly different from their situation last June. The main logistic effort during the summer was directed at maintaining and improving the system in southern Laos and Cambodia. Although some supplies procured in Cambodia moved into the system, we estimate that there was a net drawdown of stockpiles in southern Laos.

3. We estimate that Hanoi would have little difficulty in moving supplies through the system in amounts adequate to support a continuation of a protracted war strategy throughout the war theaters of Indochina. In fact, the various offensive strategy options analyzed in our previous reports to the

Senior Review Group appear logistically feasible during the current dry season, except for that involving a sustained countrywide offensive in South Vietnam and Cambodia.

4. As for personnel infiltration, the enemy's late start this dry season has not yet precluded any strategy option except for the manpower buildup required for a sustained countrywide offensive.

5. If the enemy soon starts his dry season supply and infiltration activities in earnest, performance above the levels set in the 1970/71 dry season -- infiltration at an annual mark of 100,000 and supply inputs on the order of 300 tons per day -- should give the enemy freedom to choose from a number of offensive options both during the dry season and in the second half of 1972. Activity below these levels would suggest an increasingly limited capability and/or a deliberate intent during 1972 to reduce the scale of the fighting in South Vietnam and Cambodia below that of 1971.

6. It is too early to make a confident prediction of Hanoi's plans for the 1971/72 dry season on the basis of infiltration and logistics data alone. Information from other sources does not yet shed much direct light on Communist intentions. Hanoi probably would still like to mount some sort of highly visible military effort during the Presidential election year in the United States. Moreover, the successive military callups of the last year or so appear to have given Hanoi, quantitatively at least, a substantial reservoir of manpower for such an effort. We note, however, that Hanoi's spokesmen no longer seem to be calling for stepped up action to achieve "strategic victories" as they did during the first half of 1971. The reasons for this change are uncertain, but whatever forced the apparent change in strategy can presumably be ironed out in relatively short order. Thus, there could be a return to the aggressive policy that seemed to be setting the tone in the first half of this year. What little current evidence there is, however, points toward a low-to-moderate rather than a high Communist military profile -- except for North Laos where the enemy appears to be building up for major military activity during the current dry season.

Discussion

The 1970/71 Dry Season

Logistics

7. During the 1970/71 dry season (October-May) the North Vietnamese moved supplies into the Laotian Panhandle at a daily average rate of about 270-345 tons. At the low end of the range this input of supplies would have been just adequate to support the enemy's supply requirements for protracted war; performance at the high end of the range would have permitted some buildup of stockpiles. Our judgment on the relationship of supply input to the enemy's average requirement for externally procured supplies during 1970/71 is made on the basis of the size of the enemy force and assumes that expenditures are made at the 1970 combat level with adjustments made for supply losses resulting from Allied ground actions and air interdiction. Several factors lead us to assume that the enemy probably entered the 1971 wet season with stockpiles neither appreciably larger or smaller than they were the preceding October -- the expansion of enemy forces in southern Laos and the supply losses during operation Lam Son 719 are noteworthy elements in this judgment.

Personnel

8. During the 1970/71 dry season, about 106,200 men were infiltrated into Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. This total far surpassed the 1969/70 dry season total of 65,700 -- chiefly because of the greater number of troops sent to southern Laos,

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The 1970/71 total, however, is well below that achieved during the 1967/68 dry season when the pipeline was flooded with about 250,000 personnel both to expand forces and to replace the sizable losses resulting from the several offensives undertaken during 1968. The significant fact about the level of infiltration in the 1970/71 dry season is that it was sufficient only to maintain Communist forces at their end-1970 level. Table 2 shows that VC/NVA combat forces in South Vietnam declined by some 45,000-



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55,000 during 1970. The bulk of this decline -- 25,000 to 30,000 troops -- was a result of VC/NVA unit deployments to Cambodia and Laos; the remaining 20,000-25,000 reflect net attrition in South Vietnam. As indicated in Table 2, this erosion has continued through to the present time.

Table 2

Estimated Strength of Communist
Regular Combat Forces in Indochina

	Dec 1969	Dec 1970	Oct 1971
VC/NVA combat forces	130-150	105-120	105-120
South Vietnam	130-150	85-95	80-90
Cambodia	--	20-25	25-30
KC combat forces	N.A.	10-20	15-30
PL/NVA combat forces	55-65	60-70	65-80
Northern Laos	35-40	30-35	35-40
Southern Laos	20-25	30-35	30-40

9. Communist combat forces in Cambodia and Laos have increased somewhat during the last year and a half. It must be noted, however, that it is more difficult this year than in the past to assess the trends in Communist combat forces because of a decrease in the volume of data on unit strengths, losses, and replacements, particularly in Laos and Cambodia. Thus, our calculations of the extent to which forces in Cambodia and Laos have been augmented this year should not be regarded as firm estimates.

The 1971 Wet Season

10. In the Senior Review Group studies the possibility of enemy infiltration activities during the 1971 wet season was acknowledged but no attempt

was made to introduce any numerical judgments into the basic analysis. In retrospect, this appears to have been appropriate. The enemy during the past several months has introduced only small numbers of men and relatively small amounts of supplies into the infiltration pipeline, although extensive preparations were under way during most of the summer in preparation for the dry season logistical activities.

Logistics

11. During the 1971 wet season, 25X1 25X1 25X1 kept most of their personnel in place, although limited numbers were withdrawn to North Vietnam. The wet season itself was unusually mild this year. Rainfall in the eastern Panhandle this season measured about 60 to 70 inches for the period June-October -- some 40 inches less than last year and about 15-20 inches below the historical average. The months of heaviest rainfall came early -- June and July -- then tapered off to unusually low levels. As in past years, the season's tropical storms and typhoons were responsible for most of the damage and disruption to the enemy's transportation system. This year, however, the storms were widely spaced* so that the system did not experience any widespread or sustained damage during the rainy season.

12. During the summer, 25X1 in southern Laos conducted an unprecedented road maintenance and repair program and began construction of several new roads which should soon become trafficable. Communist road crews also kept most major roads in the Panhandle motorable, and by the end of September the road net in southern Laos was in better condition than at any comparable time in the war. Work on access routes across the DMZ gave the system further redundancy and enhanced Hanoi's capability for quick resupply or reinforcement of its forces in MR 1.

* *The major storms and typhoons affecting the area were: Typhoon Harriet on 6 June; tropical Storm Kim on 12 June, tropical Storm Della on 30 September, tropical Storm Elaine on 9 October, and Typhoon Hester on 23 October.*

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13. In northeastern Cambodia, monsoon weather closed crossborder Route 97/110 from southern Laos to vehicle traffic in late June or early July, but other key roads in the area remained motorable and supported light to moderate traffic. In addition,

25X1 [redacted] maintained an extensive river transportation system on the Mekong and Tonle Kong Rivers. Consequently, the enemy has maintained a viable and much improved transportation system over that which existed last year at this time.

14. Paradoxically, detected supply movements in the Panhandle were much lower this wet season than last despite the extensive road maintenance program and the relatively light level of rainfall. As a result, stockpiles in the Panhandle were undoubtedly drawn down to support logistic forces maintained there during the wet season, and throughput of supplies to South Vietnam was light. Although we detected very little logistic activity throughout southern Laos during the rainy season, [redacted]

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an impressive level of logistic activity. Large tonnages of supplies -- mainly rice and petroleum -- were transported from south to north, while significant amounts of arms, ammunition, and equipment were moved southward.

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[redacted] The Communists were probably able to augment their stockpiles of rice and petroleum in northeastern Cambodia this summer.

[redacted]

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16. [redacted] The great majority of recent infiltrees appear to have been ear-marked for duty in southern Laos or in the area of northeastern Cambodia [redacted] Most of the troops so far committed to southern Laos/northeastern Cambodia probably have been assigned Rear Services roles or may be security forces deployed to protect the infiltration corridor.

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Current Status of the System

Logistics

17. Hanoi's ability to support the war effort with military supplies continues to be dependent on aid from its allies. Military aid thus far in 1971 has been at a level adequate to support the present scale of the war and to offset losses incurred by the North Vietnamese during the Allied thrust into Laos last spring. As shown in the following tabulation, military aid to North Vietnam during the first six months of 1971 was valued at $100 million, a slightly higher rate of delivery than in 1970.

	1968	1969	1970	Jan-Jun a/ 1971
Total	*390*	*225*	*155*	*100*
USSR	290	120	70	40
Communist China	100	105	85	60

a. Preliminary.

18. Military deliveries during the second half of 1971 will probably continue at a higher rate than in 1970, given the buildup in antiaircraft defenses which has been under way for some months

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as well as the continued replenishment of supplies lost or expended against Lam Son 719. Furthermore, there are indications of substantial military aid commitments for 1972. Communist willingness to supply North Vietnam with continuing military aid was affirmed by Soviet President Podgorny and Communist Chinese Politburo member Li Hsien-nien during the course of their recent visits to Hanoi.

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19. There is significant evidence that logistical preparations in North Vietnam are near a dry season posture and that major stocks of supplies now in storage there will facilitate the dry season push through the Laos Panhandle once it is initiated.

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25X1 confirms a new large buildup of supply stockpiles within southern North Vietnam. A number of new truck parks/storage areas near the North Vietnamese/Laos border have been established and are sustaining heavy activity, while some older facilities have been enlarged or upgraded and are sustaining a higher level of logistical activity than a year ago. Significant new construction has been observed in the Hanoi, Haiphong, and Vinh storage areas, where 107 new storage-type buildings have been completed or under construction since mid-1970.

20. Other developments in North Vietnam seem to indicate that the Communists are preparing for a major logistic push. Significantly augmented antiaircraft defenses in the southern Panhandle have improved the North Vietnamese ability to defend their resupply system. Possibly as many as 17 antiaircraft regiments and 14 SAM battalions

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may be located in Quang Binh Province, which is unprecedented and is by far the largest concentration of air defense firepower ever observed in southern North Vietnam. Some of the antiaircraft units probably will move into Laos to defend the corridor from Allied bombing.

21. Similarly, in southern Laos and northern Cambodia, the logistical system appears to be in good condition. Despite Typhoon Hester, which struck in late October, reporting indicates that this has been the driest transition phase in southern Laos in some years. The road net in most of Laos is in better shape than in previous years at a comparable stage of the season. The organizational structure appears solid. 25X1

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indications that the Communists may be about to embark on their dry season campaign. 25X1

25X1 an important indicator of traffic levels and patterns in Laos, increased sharply over the low levels of previous weeks. The increase coincided with a period of high moon illumination, a period favored by the Communists for kicking off accelerated logistic activities.

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Personnel

23. In North Vietnam there are numerous indications that the enemy should be ready to start the normal dry season infiltration drive. Available evidence suggests that Hanoi has maintained normal cycles of induction and training during the current year* so that in manpower terms Hanoi is capable of supporting the war at present or even markedly accelerated levels.

24. North Vietnam has called up a substantial number of men for military service during the first 10 months of 1971, somewhat over 100,000. The first wave of recruiting occurred in the winter after an "appeal" of the Party and the Government on 10 December 1970 for increased preparedness following US air attacks in support of the Son Tay raid over North Vietnam in late November. Newspapers and radio broadcasts claimed that large numbers had "volunteered" for military service. The volume of articles tapered off in mid-January but then rose again in late March and continued at a substantial level through May. In mid-June, Politburo member Truong Chinh made reference in a speech to military recruitment plans for the second half of 1971, and there is evidence in the press of another upswing in recruiting in the summer. During August and September, for example, the army newspaper carried a steady flow of photographs of recruits departing for induction centers. 25X1 25X1 indications of recruiting campaigns during the winter, spring, and summer. 25X1 25X1 We estimate that recruitment in 1970 was on the order of 150,000 persons. The 1971 campaign, based on evidence now available, should result in about the same number of recruitments.

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[redacted]

* *The major floods in August and September may have interrupted some training activities for a time but should not have had an appreciable effect on the availability of troops for infiltration.*

Prospects for the 1971/72 Dry Season

Logistics

26. Several signs point to a judgment that the Communist must implement and sustain another major logistics drive this dry season. The reduced throughput of supplies during the past dry season and the low level of activity during the summer imply that stocks probably have been drawn down substantially. Added to the need to further refurbish the logistic system is the fact that, as each week passes without major logistical movement through the system, the basic resupply requirement -- just that needed to support a protracted war strategy -- becomes progressively more burdensome. It should be noted, however, that the launching of this season's logistic offensive is not behind schedule. A mid-November to early December dry season start for sustained traffic movement is not unusual. For example, the 1970/71 dry season logistics campaign did not get fully under way until mid-November, while that of the previous season was not initiated until early December.

27. If, as seems likely, the Communists soon get their logistics drive under way, we estimate that they should be fully capable of matching their 1970/71 dry season input performance (on an average basis, about 300 tons per day). Such an attainment

would mean that from the logistics point of view, Hanoi would have essentially the same options we attributed to it during the last dry season. With the exception of the logistic inputs required to sustain countrywide offensives in South Vietnam and Cambodia, the logistics requirements for the remaining options could be met during this dry season, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3

Probable Period
of Satisfying Logistic Requirements
During the 1971-72 Dry Season

	Early (Nov-Dec)	Mid-Season (Jan-Feb)	Late (Mar-May)
Protracted warfare	X		
Sustained offensives in:			
GVN MR 1	X		
GVN MR 2	X		
GVN MR 1 and 2		X	
Cambodia		X	
GVN MR 1/Cambodia			X
GVN/Cambodia	Not attainable		

28. One of the major logistic constraints facing Hanoi would be the difficulty of pre-positioning and moving supplies within South Vietnam. Area by area, the following comments pertain.

GVN MR 1

29. The current northeast monsoon will probably restrain offensive activity through the remainder of 1971 and possibly January 1972. However, because of the proximity of major supply arteries in Laos and the new road through the DMZ the enemy could quickly build up supplies for an offensive.

GVN MR 2

30. Enemy capabilities to support an offensive in this military region are much more dependent on the performance of the logistics system in Laos. If the enemy successfully moves supplies through Laos and into the region in the next few months -- as he appears prepared to do -- a substantial offensive could be undertaken late in 1971 or early in 1972 against targets especially in the central highlands. The enemy still would face a formidable task in attempting to position supplies and troops to support an offensive in the populated coastal sectors of MR 2. Given the present security situation in MR 2 and the status of friendly forces there, it is unlikely that the Communists can mount a major, sustained offensive in the coastal provinces during the coming dry season.

GVN MR 3

31. The enemy is in a less favorable logistic position in MR 3. The logistics resupply system into this region cannot be expected to function effectively until well into the 1971/72 dry season. The priming of the supply system in southern Laos this past summer [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]

should facilitate the delivery of supply somewhat earlier this year than last, but initial shipments will undoubtedly be used to replenish stocks. It is doubtful if the enemy will have established a secure enough logistics base from which to confidently launch widespread and sustained attacks into this area during the 1971/72 dry season.

GVN MR 4

32. The enemy's logistic posture is most tenuous in MR 4. Although there is an identifiable supply element linking Communist forces here with the logistic system in Cambodia, Communist forces in MR 4 have experienced significant resupply problems over the past year. Operating from a very weak logistic base, the enemy is unlikely to launch major military actions in MR 4 this dry season. However, the tight logistics situation

could change abruptly through a series of successful sea infiltration attempts or in a matter of several months with the movement of supplies down through Cambodia. As in MR 3, however, the Communists in MR 4 are likely to restore depleted stocks before initiating widespread attacks. Thus, no major offensives are envisioned this dry season.

Cambodia

33. We foresee no major logistic impediments to sharp increases in enemy offensive activity in Cambodia. Logistically, the Communists could with little prior warning support a major offensive north and east of Phnom Penh early in 1972 because of this area's proximity to Communist bases in Kompong Cham Province, which are supplied by major lines of communication from Laos. The Communists have access to abundant rice supplies in Cambodia. In addition, substantial deliveries of arms and ammunition could be accomplished [redacted] 25X1

Personnel

34. As the current dry season starts, certain facts about the enemy manpower position are clear: even with the absence from combat of most US ground combat forces (but assuming current levels of US combat support), North Vietnam probably will have to provide about 100,000 infiltrators (fillers for all theaters) just to maintain its current force levels.

35. This assessment is supported by an analysis of the changing disposition of US and ARVN maneuver battalions in South Vietnam during the period 1968-71. Since its peak in April 1968, the total number of US and ARVN maneuver battalions in South Vietnam has decreased by 62, from 278 to 216 as of September 1971. The total number assigned to combat operations, however, has been reduced by only 13. The number of ARVN maneuver battalions currently assigned to combat operations is up by 73, and the number assigned to security, pacification, training, and reserve operations is down by 49.

36. In part, this progress was made possible by the success of the pacification program in

South Vietnam in expanding South Vietnamese government influence and control over the rural population. The complementary factors of an erosion of VC/NVA Combat Forces and Guerrillas since 1968 and a concurrent upgrading of South Vietnamese territorial forces aided and abetted the pacification successes, as has the overall qualitative improvement in the performance of ARVN maneuver battalions.

37. The 100,000 level of infiltration, then, represents a lower limit for Hanoi's manpower commitment if the force structure is to be kept intact and at a level which would permit the continuation of the combat strategy pursued over the past three years. If Hanoi were to opt for any of the other logistically feasible strategy options analyzed in our previous studies for the Senior Review Group, the additional infiltration and force augmentation requirements would range from 20,000 to 80,000 troops.* Even though the enemy is now approximately one month into the "normal" dry season, there still remains sufficient time to meet the personnel requirements -- from the standpoint of infiltration -- for these strategy options. The force augmentations could all be completed in a maximum of four months. Force augmentations required for major offensives in the western sectors of MRs 1 and 2 could be completed in six to eight weeks. Force augmentations for an all-out offensive in Cambodia would require four months to complete.

The View from Hanoi

38. There have been almost no recent indications from any quarter that the Vietnamese Communists are preparing for a higher level of military activity in the coming dry season than they attained in the last couple of years. This is a change from the first half of 1971, when Hanoi's spokesmen seemed to be calling for stepped-up action to maintain the momentum of Communist "strategic victories" in southern Laos and Cambodia.

* *These estimates exclude the additional manpower requirements needed to sustain infiltration and augment forces to the level required for a sustained countrywide offensive throughout South Vietnam and Cambodia.*

What happened to alter the message can only be guessed at: perhaps the Vietnamese Communists were thrown seriously off stride beginning in July by the prospect of big-power summitry; perhaps the change stemmed from a more pessimistic appraisal in the field of their near-term potential in Indochina. It could also be -- although this is unlikely -- that flooding in the summer and fall forced a postponement of whatever North Vietnam was planning to do during the dry season. But whatever the reason, there is little question that the cutting edge has been missing from nearly all Vietnamese Communist pronouncements, public and private, since mid-1971.

39. It appears at this point in time that the coming dry season may be much like the last one: the Communists will be concentrating on efforts to extend the southern end of their supply system and to improve their political and military access to the populated areas of South Vietnam. They will also keep up an available level of military pressure and on some battlefields -- parts of MR 1 and the central highlands of South Vietnam and parts of Cambodia -- the fighting could become fairly extensive. The Communists will be particularly alert for opportunities to deal ARVN a sharp blow, as they did this year at Snuol and they tried to do recently in the Krek-Tay Ninh Province fighting.

A Note on Northern Laos

40. Communist logistical capabilities in northern Laos are largely independent of those in other areas of Indochina. Whereas southern Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam all require support via the Ho Chi Minh Trail, support of the Plaine des Jarres sector does not. Nevertheless, the northern Laos logistical system is vulnerable to the same seasonal influences as the Panhandle system and thus receives only limited use during the rainy season months. This pattern was clear during the 1971 rainy season, when Communist logistical activity in the Plaine was at a very low level -- probably sufficient only to maintain their forces in place once most of them had redeployed or been pushed back to the eastern Plaine area. No substantial flow of supplies beyond

the northeastern Plaine area was necessary, because of the small number of Communist troops to the west. Similarly, their requirement for weapons and ammunition was relatively low, as the level of combat during the rainy season remained at a low level, even in the face of Vang Pao's drive across most of the Plaine.

41. Initial preparations for the 1971/72 dry season in northern Laos began to be noted as early as mid-September. 25X1 25X1

25X1 have identified a significant level of logistic activity now under way in the northeastern Plaine area where roads reportedly are in good condition and sustaining moderate to heavy vehicle activity. Increased activity is particularly noticeable in the Khang Khay area where the Communists are reportedly now building substantial stockpiles in anticipation of their expected dry season offensive on the Plaine. Reporting on route conditions east of the Plaine toward North Vietnam is sporadic, but the most recent information available 25X1 25X1 indicated that Route 7 was open and appears to be supporting a light to moderate level of vehicle traffic -- good evidence that some supplies and personnel are now moving into the Plaine des Jarres area.*

42. From a logistics point of view, the Communists should have no trouble winning back the Plaine once the dry season is under way and the route system has been completely refurbished. The capability of their logistic system to support an offensive there was amply proved in 1970 when friendly irregulars were driven from the Plaine in a matter of

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weeks. The Communists will have more difficulty supporting offensive action west of the Plaine, where the rudimentary supply system has been badly disrupted by the Irregular drive this summer. Assuming that the government forces maintain a credible military capability in the area, it might be well into the dry season before the enemy would be in a logistical position to sustain a drive west of the Plaine.

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44. Some of the deployment probably is to replace losses, but the magnitude suggests that there will be an overall increase in the Communist force level near the Plaine. The deployment of forces, probably to the Plaine area, is in preparation for the anticipated Communist offensive to retake the Plaine.

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

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Khmer Communist Combat Forces in Cambodia

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

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
November 1971

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

KHMER COMMUNIST COMBAT FORCES IN CAMBODIA

Introduction

1. One of the more vexing problems facing the intelligence community is to delineate the size, disposition, and functioning of the Khmer Communist (KC) combat forces in Cambodia. Available reporting has provided a mixed bag of fragmentary and often contradictory data that at best provide only spotty insights on the development of this force structure. The data, however, do provide a consistent theme on the nature of these forces. First, most KC units include Vietnamese Communist cadre, and, second, some of these units are attached to larger Vietnamese Communist formations. This memorandum provides a preliminary assessment of the development and the size of the KC force structure and offers judgments on its current capabilities.

Discussion

Background

2. The Vietnamese Communists began to pressure forces of the government of Cambodia about two weeks after the fall of Prince Sihanouk in March of 1970. In April they began offensive action to expand control north and west of their border base areas, and, by May 1970, Communist forces had moved as far as Siemreab in northwest Cambodia. By the end of July the enemy had taken over most of the area north and east of the Tonle Sap and north of Route 7 and established pockets of control south and southwest of Phnom Penh (see the map).

3. After driving Cambodian forces from these areas, the Communists began to recruit the local Khmer populace into military units. In addition,

Note: This memorandum was prepared by the Office of Economic Research and coordinated within CIA.

they sought to create a KC political infrastructure to administer local government in the Communist- controlled areas and to provide Communist military units with food collected as taxes from the local population.(1) KC Military Regions (KC MRs) were established throughout the country apparently based on former Khmer Rouge and possibly Viet Minh administrative areas. Thus far, only two of these regions, MR 203 -- in Svay Rieng, Prey Veng, and southern Kandal Provinces -- and MR 304 -- covering much of northwest Cambodia -- have been positively identified. There is evidence, however, to indicate that KC MRs have been established in other areas. These KC MRs are in addition to those created by the Vietnamese Communists for the control of their main force units in Cambodia.(2)

4. The development of KC military forces initially departed from the traditional Communist pyramidal pattern noted in the South Vietnamese insurgent movement. In that insurgency the Communists first established guerrilla units at the village and hamlet level; then local force units at the district and province level; and, finally, main force units at the military region level. In Cambodia, however, building of all three echelons of the insurgent force structure was pushed simultaneously, with the VC/NVA main force units serving as the principal element around which indigenous Communist forces were established. Although the short time frame available to develop an occupation force was the most significant consideration underlying this new approach, the historic animosities between the Khmers and the Vietnamese -- as well as the fact that indigenous support for the Communist movement in Cambodia itself has been very shallow -- were also contributing factors.

KC Combat Strength

5. KC combat strength is currently estimated to be within a range of 15,000 to 30,000 men. This estimate includes only those personnel believed to have a significant combat capability. Thus, it does not include personnel assigned to the KC political infrastructure, administrative services units, or the village and hamlet guerrilla forces. The low end of the combat force range represents those forces actually identified in Cambodia, while

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the upper end of the range attempts to quantify what the force could be -- based on a set of "reasonable" assumptions. Information that would permit direct quantification of the total Communist force structure (both Vietnamese and Khmer) is not currently available. In addition, there are insufficient data to separate the Khmer out of the combined force structure. As a result, it has been necessary to employ an indirect estimating methodology based on a broad range of assumptions about the Communist recruiting success in Cambodia. This approach takes the known recruiting successes for the few identified KC units and extrapolates that experience over the Communist-controlled and contested areas of the country.

6. These 15,000 to 30,000 men are organized into battalions subordinate to KC sub-regions[3] or companies subordinate to KC districts or are integrated directly into VC/NVA main force regiments. The KC sub-region battalions and district companies comprise the Communist local force structure in Cambodia; while the Khmer integrated into the Vietnamese-dominated main force regiments comprise the KC input to the Communist main forces.

7. Sub-region and district forces have been formed in the Communist-controlled and contested areas in Cambodia. Although the evidence of their formation is incomplete, a fairly clear picture of their organization can be constructed. The KC sub-region unit is subordinate to the sub-region party committee and consists of a headquarters and from one to three combat battalions. The headquarters usually contains a number of Vietnamese cadre who hold key control positions and carry out most of the specialized staff functions. Vietnamese cadre are also heavily involved in the headquarters training unit, which is responsible for the indoctrination and training of local Khmer recruits. It is believed that sub-region units have been established in at least 10 of Cambodia's 19 provinces, and possibly in all 19.

8. The low end of the range for sub-region force strength was estimated by assuming, on the basis of firm reports for several provinces, that the Communists have established sub-region units of at least one battalion in each of the 10 Cambodian government provinces in which a Communist infrastructure has been identified. The high end of the sub-region estimate was reached by assuming that the Communists had established at least one sub-region battalion averaging 250 men in all 19 of Cambodia's provinces and an average of two additional battalion equivalents in each of the 10 provinces with identified infrastructures (based on evidence that this had been done in Kampong Thum, Prey Veng, and

3. A KC sub-region (also known as a sector or zone) appears to be roughly equivalent to a Cambodian government province in echelon.

Kandal Provinces). This procedure yields an estimate of from 2,500 to 10,000 men in KC sub-region units.

9. KC district units, like their sub-region seniors, are subordinate to the appropriate party committee. They consist of a headquarters and one or more combat companies and have a small detachment of Vietnamese advisers who perform many of the same functions as those at the sub-region level. It is currently estimated that the Communists have established district units in at least 53 of Cambodia's 131 districts. These districts have been under Communist control for some time and are believed to have organized KC infrastructures in place. The Cambodian government is believed to control about 40 districts and, therefore, is able to prevent the formation of combat-effective district units in these areas. There is very little information available on the remaining contested districts, and the total number of KC district units in them is unknown.

10. The estimated low end of the number of district units was obtained by identifying the number of districts believed to be actually under enemy control and assigning a district unit to each. The high end of the range was reached by taking the number of FANK-controlled districts and subtracting them from the total number of districts in Cambodia. This methodology yields a range of from 53 to 90 districts with KC units. Multiplying these figures by the reported average district strength of 130 men per unit yields a range of from 7,000 to 12,000 men in district units. The average district strength of 130 men includes two infantry companies and their associated combat support personnel. Some district administrative services personnel also may be included in this average, but available evidence does not permit them to be broken out.

11. In addition to the discrete sub-region and district forces, other Khmer have been recruited directly into Vietnamese-dominated regimental echelon units. The number of Khmer in these units varies considerably. [redacted] the 203rd Regiment in Siemreab Province has as many as 750 Khmer in its ranks, whereas the 201st Regiment in Kampong Thum Province is reported to be mostly Vietnamese. In order to account for the Khmer recruited into these mixed Vietnamese/KC units, an assessment was made of each enemy regiment in Cambodia to determine the probable number of Khmer battalion equivalents attached to it. This assessment produced a range of from 5,000 to 8,000 Khmer directly recruited into enemy main force units. Combining the estimated strengths of the Khmer in sub-region, district, and main force units (and rounding the figures) yields a total KC combat strength of 15,000 to 30,000 men.[4]

4. The remaining components of the KC force structure, the village and hamlet guerrilla units, are not included in the combat strength estimate. These units are generally of platoon size and are lightly armed with older weapons. The local Khmer in these units have had relatively little training, usually only amounting to a week or two of instruction from a Vietnamese soldier. Because of their small size, light armament, and lack of training, these units are usually relegated to such duties as standing guard, intelligence gathering, spreading propaganda, and collecting supplies from the local population.

Recruitment

12. Khmer Communist forces initially were recruited in the areas contiguous to the traditional VC/NVA base areas along the Cambodia-South Vietnam border. Some local Khmer were recruited directly into the Vietnamese main force units, while others were formed into lightly armed local units and instructed in the defense of their own villages. As the Vietnamese forces moved deeper into Cambodia, this pattern of recruitment was continued. More Khmer were recruited into the VC/NVA main force structure and Vietnamese cadre were placed in villages and began to recruit more local military units. When the KC political infrastructure began to operate above the village level, additional KC units were recruited and attached to the infrastructure at the provincial and district echelons.

13. In addition to the Khmer currently being recruited in Cambodia, ethnic Khmer trained in North Vietnam have been re-infiltrated to join the KC ranks. These personnel were recruited in Cambodia during the Viet Minh, Sihanouk, and post-Sihanouk periods and sent north for training in Communist doctrine and military science. The total number of Khmer personnel re-infiltrated from North Vietnam thus far is unclear. [redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] indicate that at least several hundred Hanoi-trained Khmer have come down the trail, and one [redacted] 25X1
25X1 [redacted] suggests that the number coming down since 1962 runs to several thousand.

14. In general, the Khmer have been reluctant to join the Vietnamese-dominated KC military units owing to their traditional distrust of the Vietnamese. Many Khmer have been drafted into service, while others have joined in hopes of making things better for their families in the Communist-controlled areas. At best, most of the KC personnel are reluctant soldiers, and many have deserted or rallied to FANK at the first opportunity. Even the Communist groups established in Cambodia prior to the fall of Prince Sihanouk are often reluctant to cooperate with the Vietnamese. Initially the Vietnamese attempted to dominate these groups and to incorporate them into the developing KC infrastructure. This effort has not been entirely successful, however, and in many areas they seem to operate as quasi-independent organizations. Nevertheless, the military units associated with these groups have been included in the combat force estimates, even though some of them may be operating independently.

Disputes and Desertions

15. There have been numerous reports of disputes between the KC and their Vietnamese mentors. They have arisen over such things as the distribution of tax receipts, travel restrictions (some imposed by the

VC/NVA on the Khmer, others imposed by the Khmer on the VC/NVA), and the reluctance of the Vietnamese to equip some KC units with modern arms. Some of these disputes have even resulted in fire fights between the two ostensible allies.

16. One prominent example of the failure of KC and VC/NVA to agree on objectives is the case of the VC/NVA-proposed attack on Kampot City. [redacted] the KC refused to participate in, or give permission for, the attack. This refusal at least temporarily prevented the Vietnamese from proceeding on their own. The Khmer are reported to feel that the VC/NVA should concern themselves only with attacking and driving Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) forces from Cambodia and should leave attacks on FANK positions to KC discretion. There have also been numerous reports of KC desertions or of KC rallying to the Cambodian government. In the Kompong Trabek area of Prey Veng Province, for example, 60 KC rallied to FANK units operating in the area during the period 22 through 28 July 1971. Since 18 March 1971, FANK claims to have received more than 4,500 KC ralliers.

Current Combat Capability

17. The present combat capability of the KC forces is estimated to be much lower than that of their Vietnamese counterparts. This lower capability stems from three main causes: low motivation, relatively poor training, and a lack of modern arms for a large part of the force structure. A low level of motivation stems from the fact that many of the KC are serving under duress, are not well treated, and do not trust the Vietnamese. The poor training results from the absence of good training facilities coupled with a shortage of Vietnamese who speak the Khmer language. The lack of modern arms apparently stems from Vietnamese mistrust of the Khmers -- the usual practice is for many KC units to be loaned newer weapons only for the conduct of specific Vietnamese-directed missions. After the mission is completed the weapons must be returned to the Vietnamese.

18. The combination of these three factors has resulted in making many KC units, especially those with few Vietnamese in them, unreliable in head-on confrontations with FANK forces. An example of this may be seen in the attempted ambush of a small FANK security force by six KC and one Vietnamese adviser. Five of the KC had had no previous battle experience and suddenly broke and ran as a result of FANK resistance. All six KC and the Vietnamese adviser subsequently were captured by the FANK unit. Even mixed Vietnamese/KC units have had little success against recent FANK large-unit operations. In operation Chenla II the combined efforts of the 201st and 205th regiments were not adequate to stop FANK from reaching Kampong Thum. It was not until regular Vietnamese units

from the Ninth Division entered the area that FANK began to have serious difficulty.

19. Recent activities of KC combat units have included the occupation of territory "liberated by VC/NVA forces," the harrassment of Cambodian government lines of communication, small attacks against ill-defended government facilities, and the defense of local areas against minor FANK incursions. KC forces, exclusive of those predominantly Vietnamese main force units, have not been identified as being heavily involved in any of the larger confrontations between Communist and Allied forces. When FANK or South Vietnamese units have moved into an area in force, the KC units have engaged only in light harrassing actions and then withdrawn. Given the present level of equipment and training, KC units are not believed to be capable of independent offensive operations into FANK-controlled territory.

20. Clearly, the mutual distrust harbored by the Khmers and the Vietnamese coupled with a Khmer lack of enthusiasm for the Communist cause is at the core of the problem not only of a low level of KC combat capability, but also of the high level of disputes and desertions. Despite these problems, however, the Vietnamese have succeeded in creating a sizable KC force structure. This has been accomplished partly by threat and impressment, as well as placing formerly discontented Khmer in positions of apparent authority in the KC structure. Many Khmer in Communist-controlled areas thus find it in their best interests to continue to cooperate with the Vietnamese.

Near-Term Outlook

21. The KC force structure is expected to continue its growth -- both quantitative and qualitative -- in the near future. Several new training camps have been constructed with a reported total capacity of several thousand men. These new camps coupled with the growing number of both Vietnamese and Hanoi-trained Khmer cadre being infiltrated into Cambodia should improve the instruction and indoctrination of the KC troops. The increasing use of ethnic Khmer cadre should also serve to relieve many of the problems resulting from Khmer hatred of Vietnamese. If the Vietnamese decide that they can trust the KC enough to equip them with modern small arms and crew-served weapons, KC military effectiveness will be greatly improved. The possession of modern arms not only should increase KC fire power but also would improve morale and increase KC independence. This increased independence may not appear to be entirely desirable to the Vietnamese, however, and they may withhold modern arms from many local KC units since the KC can still perform their population control function without them.

22. Even with the projected increases in KC strength and capability, they will probably not be able to pose a serious offensive threat to FANK forces in the near term. They are not likely to improve at a much faster rate than FANK, nor are they likely to be able to expand enough to outnumber FANK forces. Their primary role for the foreseeable future will continue to be the occupation of VC/NVA-liberated territory, with an increasing ability to defend that territory against minor FANK incursions. They also can be expected to become increasingly bold in striking lightly-defended FANK outposts. As the KC continue to expand, they can be expected to relieve some of the VC/NVA main force units currently tied down protecting major Communist lines of communication in Cambodia. These units could then reorient their activities toward Allied forces in Cambodia and adjacent areas in South Vietnam.

25X1

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 12 Nov 71

TO: ADDI

ROOM NO.	BUILDING

REMARKS:

For your approval prior to dissemination.

FROM: St/P/ER—Control

ROOM NO. 4F41	BUILDING Hdqrs.	

FORM NO 1 FEB 55 241 REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED. (47)

STAT

Approved For Release 2004/08/03 : CIA-RDP78T02095R000500190001-4

Summary of Logistics Data in SRG Studies
April 1971 and November 1971

In the April studies the logistic performance during the 1970-71 dry season was estimated to be 295-370 tons per day. This was compared to an input requirement for protracted warfare of 278 tons per day and input requirements for various offensive strategies ranging from 280-364 tons per day. The input requirement was based on average OB and expenditures for 1970.

In the November study the logistic performance during the 1970-71 dry season was estimated to be 270-345 tons per day. This was not explicitly compared with input requirements but additional information permits us to revise these based on 1971 OB and expenditures. For the protracted warfare characteristic of 1971 (excluding Lam Son 719) the input requirement is set at 263 tons per day. From this base, input requirementsfor various offensive strategies range from 266 to 351 tons per day.

While these changes do not alter any judgements made in the April studies they permit us to present a forecast for 1971-72 based on the most recent experience. To recapitulate: 270-345 tons or supplies per day inputed into Laos during 1970-71 matched against a minimum requirement of 278 tons per day for the 1970-71 dry season and the 1971 wet season. During the 1971-72 period if the enemy is able to equal 1970-71 input performance (270-345 ton) this would be matched against requirements as follows:

Case 1	(protracted)	263
Case 2	(MR 1)	294-312
Case 3	(MR 2)	266-268
Case 4	(MR 1,2)	297-317
Case 5	(Cambodia)	273-281
Case 6	(MR 1, Cambodia)	305-331
Case 7	(General)	319-351

ESTIMATED 1970/71 DRY SEASON (OCTOBER-MAY)
INPUT TO THE LAOTIAN PANHANDLE

Minimum Estimate	Daily Average	Dry Season Total
Trucks	270	65,000
Maximum Estimate		
Trucks	270	65,000
Waterway	5	1,200
Pipeline	70	16,800
Total	345	83,000

25X1 [redacted]

Estimated 1971 Wet Season (June-September) Input to the Laotian Panhandle

	Daily Average	Short Tons Wet Season Total
Minimum estimate		
Trucks	16	1,996
Maximum estimate		
Trucks	16	1,996
Waterway	0	0
Pipeline	3*	366
Total	19	2,362

* Estimate based on 1971 wet season POL requirement, no allowance was made for stockpiling. This compares with the 7th AF estimate of 3 tons per week.

25X1 [redacted]

25X1

[redacted]

1971/72 Dry Season Supply Flows Needed to Meet Requirements for Sustained Offensive Operations

	Short Tons (Including 25% BDA)	
	Daily Requirement	Cumulative Dry Season Inputs
Southern Laos		
1971/72 dry season	144	34,560
1972 wet season	75	9,000
Case 1		
Minimum Requirement: South Vietnam and Cambodia	54	19,619
Total		63,179a/
Daily input requirement		263b/
Case 2		
Military region 1, low combat elsewhere	75-87	26,888-31,275
Total		70,448-74,835a/
Daily input requirement		294-312b/
Case 3		
Military region 2, low combat elsewhere	56-58	20,250-20,700
Total		63,810-64,260a/
Daily input requirement		266-268b/

a. Including southern Laos tonnages, above.
b. The daily input requirement is calculated on the basis of a 240 day dry season (October-May) and includes and allowance for air losses.

1971/72 Dry Season Supply Flows Needed to Meet Requirements for Sustained Offensive Operations

	Short Tons (Including 25% BDA)	
	Daily Requirement	Cumulative Dry Season Inputs
Case 4		
Military regions 1 & 2, low combat elsewhere	77-91	27,788-32,625
Total		71,348-76,185a/
Daily input requirement		297-317b/
Case 5		
Cambodia; low combat elsewhere	61-66	22,050-23,850
Total		65,610-67,410a/
Daily input requirement		273-281b/
Case 6		
Military region 1 and Cambodia, low combat elsewhere	82-99	29,588-35,775
Total		73,148-79,335a/
Daily input requirement		305-331b/
Case 7		
Country-wide South Vietnam and Cambodia	92-113	32,962-40,725
Total		76,522-84,285a/
Daily input requirement		319-351b/

a. Including southern Laos tonnages.
b. The daily input requirement is calculated on the basis of a 240 day dry season (October-May) and includes an allowance for air losses.

LAOS PANHANDLE REQUIREMENTS
1971/72 DRY SEASON (240 DAYS)

	Short Tons	
	Daily	Cumulative
Class I	43 x (240)	10,320
Class II & IV	11 x (240)	2,640
Class III	46 x (240)	11,040
Class V	15 x (240)	3,600
Total	115 x (240)	27,600
Total with 25% bomb damage (BDA)	144 x (240)	34,560

1972 Wet Season (120 Days)

Class I	43 x (120)	5,160
Classes II & IV	11 x (120)	1,320
Class III	3 x (120)	360
Class V	3 x (120)	360
Total	60 x (120)	7,200
Total with 25% BDA	75 x (120)	9,000

Case 1: Minimum Requirement for Forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia

		Short Tons	
		Daily	Cumulative
MR 1	Class I	20 (365)	7,300
	Classes II, IV, V	5 (365)	1,825
MR 2	Classes II, IV, V	2 (365)	730
MR 3	Classes II, IV, V	2 (365)	730
MR 4	Classes II, IV, V	2 (365)	730
Cambodia	Classes II, III, IV, V	12 (365)	4,380
Total		43 (365)	15,695
Total with 25% BDA			19,619

Case 2: Requirement for High Level of Combat in MR 1, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere

		Short Tons		
		Daily		Cumulative
MR 1	Class I (low combat)	20	(180)	3,600
	(buildup)	25x1.5 25x2.0	(180)- (180)	6,750- 9,000
	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	5	(180)	900
	(buildup)	14x1.5 14x2.0	(180)- (180)	3,780- 5,040
MR 2	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
MR 3	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
MR 4	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
Cambodia	Classes II, III, IV, V (low combat)	12	(360)	4,320
Total				21,510-25,020
Total with 25% BDA				26,888-31,275

CASE 3:
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT IN MR 2,
MINIMUM REQUIREMENT ELSEWHERE

		Short Tons	
		Daily	Cumulative
MR 1	Class I (low combat)	20 (360)	7,200
	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	5 (360)	1,800
MR 2	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2 (180)	360
	(buildup)	4x1.5 (180)- 4x2.0 (180)	1,080-1,440
MR 3	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2 (360)	720
MR 4	Classes II, IV, V	2 (360)	720
Cambodia	Classes II, III, IV, V	12 (360)	4,320
Total			16,200-16,560
Total with 25% BDA			20,250-20,700

CASE 4:
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT IN MRS 1 AND 2, MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS ELSEWHERE

	Short Tons	
	Daily	Cumulative
MR 1 Class I (low combat)	20 (180)	3,600
(buildup)	25x1.5 (180)-25x2 (180)	6,750-9,000
Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	5 (180)	900
(buildup)	14x1.5 (180)-14x2 (180)	3,780-5,040
MR 2 Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2 (180)	360
(buildup)	4x1.5 (180)-4x2 (180)	1,080-1,440
MR 3 Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2 (360)	720
MR 4 Classes II, IV, V	2 (360)	720
Cambodia Classes II, III, IV, V	12 (360)	4,320
Total		22,230-26,100
Total with 25% BDA		27,788-32,625

CASE 5:
REQUIREMENT FOR HIGH LEVEL OF COMBAT
IN CAMBODIA, MINIMUM REQUIREMENT ELSEWHERE

		Short Tons		
		Daily		Cumulative
MR 1	Class I (low combat)	20	(360)	7,200
	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	5	(360)	1,800
MR 2	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
MR 3	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
MR 4	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
Cambodia	Classes II, III IV, V (low combat)	12	(180)	2,160
	(buildup)	16x1.5 (180)- 16x2.0 (180)		4,320- 5,760
Total				17,640- 19,080
Total with 25% BDA				22,050- 23,850

Case 6: Requirement for High Level of Combat in MR 1 and in Cambodia, Minimum Requirement Elsewhere

		Short Tons		
		Daily		Cumulative
MR 1	Class I (low combat)	20	(180)	3,600
	(buildup)	25x1.5 25x2.0	(180)- (180)	6,750- 9,000
	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	5	(180)	900
	(buildup)	14x1.5 14x2.0	(180)- (180)	3,780- 5,040
MR 2	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
MR 3	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
MR 4	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(360)	720
Cambodia	Classes II, III, IV, V (low combat)	12	(180)	2,160
	(buildup)	16x1.5 16x2.0	(180)- (180)	4,320- 5,760
Total				23,670-28,620
Total with 25% BDA				29,588-35,775

Case 7: Requirement for Forces in South Vietnam and Cambodia to Prepare for General Offensives

		Short Tons Daily		Cumulative
MR 1	Class I (low combat)	20	(180)	3,600
	(buildup)	25x1.5 25x2.0	(180)- (180)	6,750- 9,000
	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	5	(180)	900
	(buildup)	14x1.5 14x2.0	(180)- (180)	3,780- 5,040
MR 2	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(180)	360
	(buildup)	4x1.5 4x2.0	(180)- (180)	1,080- 1,440
MR 3	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	52	(180)	360
	(buildup)	7x1.5 7x2.0	(180)- (180)	1,890- 2,520
MR 4	Classes II, IV, V (low combat)	2	(180)	360
	(buildup)	3x1.5 3x2.0	(180)- (180)	810- 1,080
Cambodia	Classes II, III, IV, V (low combat)	12	(180)	2,160
	(buildup)	16x1.5 16x2.0	(180)- (180)	4,320- 5,760
Total				26,370-32,580
Total with 25% BDA				32,962-40,725

TIME REQUIRED TO BUILD STOCKPILES

The estimated time which will be required for the Communists to augment their stockpiles to levels sufficient for carrying out the various strategy options are shown in the table. The number of days required to build stockpiles is equal to the required stockpile buildup divided by the daily supply availability: the former estimates are made in the April WSAG study; the daily supply availability represents the difference between the midpoint of the supply input range (270-345 = 308 STPD) minus the daily requirement for maintaining protracted warfare (263 STPD), that is 308-263 = 45 tons daily.

TIME REQUIRED TO BUILD STOCKPILES

	Required Stockpile Buildup -- Midpoint	Available Supplies (Daily)	Days Required to Build Stockpiles
Case 1 Low Combat	No stockpile buildup required.		
Case 2 High Combat, MR 1 (midpoint)	9,730	7-82 45	119-1,390 216 (7 mo.)
Case 3 High Combat, MR 2 (midpoint)	1,125	7-82 45	14-161 25 (1 mo.)
Case 4 High Combat, MRS 1 & 2 (midpoint)	10,855	7-82 45	132-1,551 241 (8 mo.)
Case 5 High Combat, Cambodia (midpoint)	3,600	7-82 45	44-514 80 (3 mo.)
Case 6 High Combat, MR 1 & Cambodia (midpoint)	13,330	7-82 45	163-1,904 296 (10 mo.)
Case 7 High Combat, GVN & Cambodia (midpoint)	17,490	7-82 45	213-2,499 389 (13 mo.)

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Notes to Paper for Dr. Kissinger,
Recent Trends in Enemy Supply and Personnel
Infiltration in Indochina

Table 1 is the manpower requirements table from the 26 April 1971 report. Note that the Case I line is our end 1970 OB. The other cases were established from the following augmentation requirements:

Strategy	Augmentation	Total Infiltration
Case I (1970 level Protracted Warfare)	--	100,000
Case II (MR 1)	20,000	120,000
Case III (MR 2)	10,000	115,000
Case IV (MR 1 & 2)	30,000	135,000
Case V (Cambodia)	20,000	150,000
Case VI (MR 1/Cambodia)	40,000	180,000
Case VII (GVN/Cambodia)	60,000	250,000-300,000

Since Dec. 1970 our OB by MR has changed as follows:

	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	Camb.	Total
Dec. 70	35	23	17	15	25	115
Oct. 71	34	21	12	14	25	106

Note that 106 is at the low end of the 105-120 range shown in the new paper. We are at the low end of our range because we are at the end of the wet season hiatus in infiltration arrivals. Although it could be argued that our

augmentation requirements would have to go up to compensate for these reductions they are small in comparison to the kinds of requirements estimated except for MR 3.

The reasons for the MR estimate changes are:

MR 1 includes the threat area -- 12,000 up from 10,000. Internal forces eroded from 25,000 to 22,000.

MR 2 and MR 4 reflect erosion.

MR 3 has seen erosion of units and even disbanding of units as well as the shift of one more regiment to Cambodia (the 1st NVA). Thus, for a high level of offensive activity, force levels there would have to be augmented by 15,000 instead of the 10,000 calculated in the April studies (12,000 to 27,000 instead of 17,000 to 27,000). However, MR 3 figures only in Case 7 which postulates infiltration of 250,000-300,000, a total more than adequate to absorb the larger buildup requirement in MR 3.

Cambodia. Despite the 5,000 increase in our ranged OB estimate made earlier we have used the same 25,000 (high end of earlier estimate, low end of new one) here because of the heavy casualties of the past two months.

TABLE 1

	MR 1	MR 2	MR 3	MR 4	Cambodia	Total
Case I (Dec 1970 Protracted Warfare)	35	23	17	15	25	115
Case II (MR 1)	55	23	17	15	25	135
Case III (MR 2)	35	33	17	15	25	125
Case IV (MR 1 & MR 2)	55	33	17	15	25	145
Case V (Cambodia)	35	23	17	15	45	135
Case VI (MR 1/ Cambodia)	55	23	17	15	45	155
Case VII (GVN/ Cambodia)	55	33	27	20	40	175

Table 2 elaborates our view that the modest growth but substantial shift in missions of ARVN forces has taken up much of the slack caused by the departure of U.S. forces. We believe that this analysis is a superior substitute for the crude quick look provided previously (Varient 1 and Varient 2). It also takes account of the decline in enemy forces.

Analytically this approach looks only at the main force war. It assumes that GVN local security forces including not only PSDF, NP, PF, and RF, but those few remaining regular battalions on pacification duty can handle all VC elements below battalion size. Our main force ratio compares all VC/NVA battalions with friendly battalions on combat status. (Two small opposing biases would still be present: all VC/NVA battalions would not always be on a combat status and on the friendly side the loss of Third Nation Forces would tend to lower the ratios some). Also of course, the analysis assumes a 1 to 1 substitutability for US and ARVN infantrymen. Even though the three VC/NVA Divisions included in Cambodia have picked up an additional task of parrying FANK and protecting previously secure areas they are properly included. With this we see that the ratio is somewhat better than first quarter 1968 but lower than during 1970 when Allied momentum was high.

Table 2

Ratio of US/ARVN[a/] to VC/NVA[b/] Maneuver Forces In South Vietnam, 1968-1972

	1st Qtr 1968		1st Qtr 1970		3rd Qtr 1971		January[c/] 1972	
	Bns	Strength	Bns	Strength	Bns	Strength	Bns	Strength
SVN	172/261	123,100/74,600	204/285	135,800/57,300	159/223	96,700/38,000	151/223	90,200/38,000
		1.7		2.4		2.5		2.4
					(159/238	96,700/45,000)	(151/238	90,200/45,000)
						(2.1)		(2.0)
MR 1	53/85	41,700/30,600	64/82	48,100/19,000	44/63	30,800/17,300	40/63	27,600/17,300
		1.4		2.5		1.8		1.6
MR 2	30/53	22,200/17,000	25/57	15,500/13,700	14/51	8,000/8,800	14/51	8,000/8,800
		1.3		1.1		.9		.9
MR 3	58/69	41,000/18,000	73/84	48,500/12,600	58/38	33,600/4,800	54/38	30,300/4,800
		2.3		3.9		7.0		6.3
					(58/73	33,600/11,800)	(54/73	30,300/11,800)
						(2.9)		(2.6)
MR 4	31/44	18,300/9,000	42/59	23,700/12,000	43/51	24,300/7,000	43/51	24,300/7,000
		2.0		2.0		3.5		3.5

a. Includes only those US and ARVN maneuver battalions assigned to combat operations.
b. Figures in parenthesis include VC/NVA maneuver forces in Cambodia which represent a threat to MR 3.
c. Assumes no US maneuver battalions will be assigned to combat operations.

Table 3 shows the dramatic changes that have occurred within US and ARVN maneuver battalion totals since 1968. The number of ARVN maneuver battalions assigned to combat operations has been increased from 78 to 151, while the number of US maneuver battalions has been reduced from 94 to 8. Simultaneously, the number of ARVN battalions in a pacification and security status has been reduced from 87 to 38.

Table 3[a/]

	ARVN			US		
	CBT	SCY/PAC/ TNG/RES	Total	CBT	SCY/PAC/ TNG/RES	Total
1st Qtr 1968	78	87	165	94	19	113
1st Qtr 1970	138	42	180	66	12	78
3rd Qtr 1971	151	38	189	8	19	27
Jan. 1972	151	38	189	--	16	16
±% 1968-1972	+ 94%	-56%	+ 15%	--	-16%	- 90%

a. CBT = Combat Operations
SCY = Security Operations
PAC = Pacification Operations
TNG = Training Operations
RES = Reserve Operations